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Abstract 
 
In this paper we describe our use of the AcciMap and Risk 
Management (ActorMap) framework (RMF) to analyse two 
recent accidents – the infection outbreaks which occurred at the 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust and the 2005 
Stockwell Shooting incident. Previous work using AcciMaps and 
the RMF is described and reviewed in section 2 of the paper.  We 
then describe the case studies followed by an account of our goals 
and the procedure used to carry out the accident analyses (section 
3). The differences in our use of the methods are described in 
section 4 of the paper. Finally, we reflect on these differences in 
order to develop of a set of criteria which could be used to scope 
more detailed guidelines for the selection and use of the two 
methods.  
 
1 Introduction 
 
Complex sociotechnical systems are made up of a web of 
dynamic relationships and transactions. In many cases, systems 
drift into failure. The tendency to drift into failure and resultant 
disaster is on the increase as the combined influence of 
technological, environmental and social systems become more 
complex. A push for increased efficiency for example, or 
migration of behaviour (Rasmussen [17]), results in many 
decisions at multiple organisational levels. This push can occur 
over prolonged periods. As a result, in many systems, optimum 
efficiency lies on the boundary of safe operation. Furthermore, 
the problem is compounded as it is often difficult for operators to 
detect this drift (Perrow, [16]; Vaughan, [21]). Dekker [4] draws 
three parallels that unite this research: (1) accidents, and the drift 
that precedes them, are associated with normal people doing 
normal work in normal organizations; (2) organizations that 
involve safety-critical work are essentially trying to reconcile 
irreconcilable goals (staying safe and staying in business); (3) 
drifting into failure is incremental. Accidents do not happen 
suddenly, nor do monumentally bad decisions or huge steps away 
from the ruling norm preceding them. Within the context of the 
general public and the media they are commonly referred to as 
examples of „large-scale system failure‟.  
 
Over the years, a large number of accident analysis techniques 
have been developed that recognise the importance of 
considering the environmental context and the role played by 
systemic failings at differing levels of the organisation. Some of 
these approaches are presented as frameworks or philosophies 
(e.g., Reason [18]) while others are presented as methods (e.g., 
STAMP - Leveson, [12]; the Risk Management Framework - 
Rasmussen, [17]; AcciMaps – Svedung and Rasmussen, [19]). 
These techniques have been used to analyse a wide variety of 
domains and accident scenarios. The Risk Management 
Framework, for example, has been applied to the Walkerton 
e.Coli outbreak (Vicente and Christoffersen, [22]), as well as the 
UK BSE outbreak (Cassano-Piche et al., [3]).  
 
The prevalence of different methods, and the numerous 
interpretations of each is most likely a result of the complexity 
bound within these domains, but it can also prove to be a 
challenge to those seeking some form of „route map‟ of the 
territory as it applies to the analysis of systemic failure. Part of 
the problem is knowing where to start and judging the 
appropriateness of a specific technique for a particular domain. In 
general there is a lack of detailed guidance regarding when and 
how to use these different methods/techniques/frameworks.   
 
In this paper we consider the use of two methods originally 
developed by Jens Rasmussen – the Risk Management 
(ActorMap) Framework (RMF) and AcciMaps. The paper came 
about as the result of the authors using these techniques 
independently in order to analyse two very different domains 
(Healthcare and Policing). Our specific objectives are: (1) To 
compare and contrast examples of recent applications of the RMF 
and AcciMap techniques for accident analysis; (2) To consider 
the differences in applications of the RMF and AcciMap 
techniques in terms of any assumptions underlying their use (e.g., 
types of data, methodology, differing goals driving use of the 
techniques); (3) To systematise common features and differences 
in use of the techniques in order to provide a set of criteria for 
selecting and using the methods for accident and disaster 
analysis. 
 
2 AcciMaps and the Risk Management 
(ActorMap) Framework  
 
AcciMaps [19] is an accident analysis methodology that is used 
to represent graphically the causal factors involved in a particular 
accident or safety-compromising incident, occurring within 
complex socio-technical systems. The approach also captures the 
preconditions and actions behind that causal chain of events. 
AcciMaps are diagrams developed to support vertical integration 
across the control levels of a socio-technical system. The 
AcciMap approach differs from typical accident analysis 
approaches in that, rather than identifying and apportioning 
blame, it is used to identify and represent the causal flow of 
events and the planning, management and regulatory bodies that 
may have contributed to the scenario, with a view to improving 
system design and safety (Svedung and Rasmussen [19]). The 
AcciMap technique was developed to integrate the research of a 
number of disciplines, such as political science, decision theory, 
sociology, management studies and psychology. Rasmussen [17] 
also developed a more general modelling framework (the Risk 
Management (ActorMap) Framework) for understanding the 
dynamic interaction between these types of components within a 
large-scale sociotechnical system. The framework consists of two 
main components: a structural hierarchy describing the various 
actors; and, contextual factors influencing the activities of the 
actors.  Table 1 summarises some of the studies which have made 
use of AcciMaps and the risk management framework. 
 
Source Scope Characteristics 
of Application 
Rasmussen 
[17]; Svedung 
and Rasmussen 
[19] 
RMF, description 
of Conflict Map 
and AcciMap 
illustrated by 
examples from 
various accidents 
(e.g., transportation 
accidents, the 
Zeebrugge 
accident) 
Outline of RFM 
with components 
representing 
Government, 
regulators, 
company, 
management, 
staff, work 
context; 
Detailed examples 
of AcciMaps  
Vicente and 
Christoffersen 
[22] 
RMF and AcciMap 
- Walkerton E. coli 
outbreak 
 
Mapping of 
contributory 
factors leading up 
to the outbreak 
using the RMF 
and AcciMaps 
Cassano-Piche 
et al., [3] 
RMF and AcciMap 
– UK BSE outbreak 
 
Mapping of 
contributory 
factors leading up 
to the outbreak 
using the RMF 
and AcciMaps 
 
Table 1: Summary of studies using AcciMaps and the Risk 
Management Framework 
 
 
Source Scope Characteristics of 
Application 
Hopkins [7] AcciMap – Esso 
Gas Plant 
(Longford) 
Explosion 
Causal diagram of 
contributory 
factors leading up 
to accident using 
AcciMaps 
Johnson and de 
Almeida [10] 
RMF, AcciMap 
Brazilian space 
launch vehicle loss 
Comparison 
between 
Rasmussen and 
Svedung‟s 
AcciMap [17] and 
STAMP 
approaches [11]; 
AcciMaps – 4 
steps: ActorMap; 
AcciMap; Conflict 
Map; 
InfoFlowMap 
 
Table 1 (cont.): Summary of studies using AcciMaps and the 
Risk Management Framework 
 
As table 1 demonstrates, usage of the RMF and AcciMaps is 
subject to a good deal of variation, both in terms of scope and 
application of the methods.  In some cases (e.g., [6]), one of the 
methods is used in isolation, however, the RMF and AcciMaps 
are more commonly used in combination. In the next section we 
describe in detail our application of the methods. 
 
 
 
3  Case studies 
 
3.1 The C. difficile outbreaks within the Maidstone and 
Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust (Waterson, [23]) 
 
During the period between April 2004 and September 2006 an 
estimated 90 people died at the Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells 
NHS Trust as a result of becoming infected with the Clostridium 
difficile (C. diff.) bacteria (HC, [5, p.5]). The Healthcare 
Commission report identified a number of factors that contributed 
to the outbreaks that occurred with the Trust. These can be 
summarised in terms of five main themes: the role played by 
external organisations; management of the trust; clinical 
management on the hospital wards; the role played by the infection 
control team; and,  equipment and hygiene factors. Figure 1 depicts 
some of these contributory factors using the Risk Management 
Framework. 
 
At the very highest level of the system it is difficult to pinpoint 
exactly the role played by government-set targets as a discrete 
factor leading to the outbreaks. Targets placed many individuals, 
particularly those at trust board and management levels under a 
great deal of pressure. This pressure in itself may have led them to 
make poor decisions, and in some cases to prioritise bed occupancy 
rates at the expense of the risk of an infection outbreak.  Previous 
research on the influence that targets have on management 
decision-making in health care tends to be equivocal. Within the 
trust it is likely that targets exerted considerable pressure on the 
system as a whole and this pressure filtered down various levels of 
the system. It is possible that the drive to comply with these targets 
increased the likelihood of an adverse event or set of events taking 
place at some stage within the trust. 
 
Poor communication, confusion of responsibilities and 
accountabilities between and within the various regulatory bodies 
delayed the time in which they could react to the outbreaks. A 
separate report by the Healthcare Commission [6] examined the 
underlying causes of serious failures in NHS health care providers 
and identified large-scale organisational processes such as mergers 
and poor change management procedures as common factors.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Risk Management (ActorMap) Framework applied to 
Infection Outbreaks within the Trust  
 
 
Within the hospital the actions of senior managers were identified 
as significantly contributing to the failure to prevent and deal with 
the outbreaks. The link between management, human resource 
management (HRM) practices and work performance outcomes 
has been investigated in detail in the last few years. Wood and 
Wall [25] for example, reviewed the evidence that suggests there is 
a link between high-involvement HRM practices and employee 
productivity. High involvement HRM practices typically include 
empowering employees to make their own decisions and the 
presence of self-managed teams. The review showed that these 
types of practices in organisations do tend to increase levels of 
employee productivity. Similar effects have been shown between 
HRM practices and measurements of safety outcomes (e.g., 
number of adverse events). In general, there is strong evidence to 
suggest that aspects of management behaviour partially shape and 
determine the culture of safety within organisations (e.g., Zohar, 
[26]). 
 
Aside from the way in which senior managers behaved at the trust, 
the question still remains as to why they ignored, or at least failed 
to realise the seriousness of the outbreaks and their consequences. 
Many of the managers interviewed in the original Healthcare 
Commission report reported that they were aware of how serious 
the situation had become within the trust, but were powerless to do 
anything about it. One possible explanation is what Vaughan [22]  
in her study of the Challenger shuttle disaster termed the  
“normalization of deviance”, namely that managers over time 
began to accept and take for granted the level of infection risk 
within the Trust. Only after the level of risk built up to a point 
where it could not be controlled, did they begin to realise the 
gravity of the situation. 
 
Understaffing and general lack of resources together played a part 
in the outbreaks. Staffing ratios and levels of staff morale almost 
certainly contributed to the problem of containing the spread of 
infection on the wards. In general, the research literature provides 
some evidence that lower levels of staffing increase the likelihood 
of infections occurring. 
 
Finally, it might be conjectured that the behaviour of clinicians and 
other health care professionals within the trust shares similarities 
with those of senior managers and trust board managers. Many 
individuals at ward level were aware of the levels of poor hygiene 
and inadequate patient monitoring practices, but saw no way to 
improve the situation. Weick and Sutcliffe [24] analysed data from 
the Bristol Royal Infirmary Report and concluded that hospital 
staff became locked into particular lines of action or behaviour 
where they “search for confirmation that they are doing what they 
should be doing” (p. 73). These so-called “cultures of entrapment” 
inhibit an organisation‟s ability to break out of patterns of 
behaviour that, over time, can lead to adverse outcomes. In the case 
of the trust, they may provide some means with which to explain 
shared boundary spanning behaviours between levels within the 
hospital subsystem. 
 
 
 
3.2 The Stockwell shooting (Jenkins et al., [9])  
 
The Stockwell shooting incident, which took place in late July 
2005 in South London (UK), followed on from a set of earlier 
terrorist bombings in London.  At the time, a manhunt was on for 
the perpetrators of the attempted bombings which had taken 
placed on the previous day. A gym membership card had been 
found on one of the failed bombs and this connected Hussain 
Osman and the address ‟21 Scotia Road‟ to the attacks. As a 
result an operation was mounted at the address in order to 
apprehend Osman as he left the flat‟s communal entrance. At 
0933 hrs a man, allegedly bearing a resemblance to Osman, left 
the flat. Officers followed him on his 33-minute journey to 
Stockwell Tube Station. Two-minutes after he entered the station, 
members of the Metropolitan Police Service‟s (MPS) specialist 
firearms department (CO19) entered the station with order to 
„stop‟ a suspected suicide-bomber. Surveillance officers directed 
them towards the subject. Moments later, two of the firearams  
officers approached the man and between them shot seven shots 
into his head from close range. The man was later identified Jean 
Charles de Menzies (JCdM), a completely innocent Brazilian 
national. 
Figure 2 shows part of a larger AcciMap which was developed 
using reports written by the Independent Police Complaints 
Commission [8] and the Metropolitan Police Authority [13] (a 
more detailed version is available in Jenkins et al., [9]). The 
events within the AcciMap are coded according to when they 
occurred (e.g., pre-operation, pre-JCdM leaving the flat). Figure 2 
is made up of six levels; each of these levels involved various 
failures which ultimately led up to the shooting. The model 
highlights, amongst other things, that failings were present at all 
of the identified organisational levels. For example, at the lowest 
level, the observer „Frank‟, positioned in a van outside the flat‟s 
communal door, failed to capture an image of JCdM. His 
decision to go to the toilet prevented him from switching on the 
video camera. Likewise, had Frank connected the camera to the 
van‟s power source or had there been a second observer, vital 
information could have been captured that may have led to the 
identification of JCdM. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: AcciMap applied to Stockwell shooting incident 
 
A number of factors clearly predated the operation. In this case, 
at the higher organisational levels. Many of these failings relate 
to the ability of the system to process unambiguous information. 
For example, a failure to equip officers with radios capable of 
working underground (identified during the investigation into the 
1987 Kings Cross Fire) meant that firearms officers had no 
contact with their superiors after entering the station. The 
organisation also appears to have lacked a well-trained lexicon 
relating to orders and rules of engagement. According to the 
IPPC report, the „stop‟ command was not clear. A mismatch in 
understanding between the different levels of command was also 
evident. Information from officers on the ground was 
consolidated without considering the negative identifications. 
This undoubtedly affected the perception of those in the 
distributed command centre. 
 
4 Comparing our use of AcciMaps and the Risk 
Management Framework 
 
Our use of the RMF and AcciMaps showed some clear 
similarities and differences both in terms of the procedure which 
was used to carry out the analysis and the conclusions that were 
drawn regarding the causes of the accidents and incidents. Table 
2 compares our use of the methods as they relate to our goals, 
intentions of use and procedure. 
 
 
 AcciMaps 
Jenkins et al. [9] 
Risk Management 
(ActorMap) 
Framework 
Waterson [23] 
Context 
of use 
Command and 
Control – Policing 
Anti-Terrorism  
Healthcare – Hospital 
Acquired Infections 
Goals and 
intentions 
of use 
Modelling of the 
events leading up to 
the shooting (e.g., 
capturing aspects of 
decision-making, 
communication, use 
of equipment and 
physical resources) 
Use of the systems 
approach to analyse and 
explain causes of the 
outbreaks; to further 
understand causal 
linkages and 
dependencies across 
system levels 
Procedure 1. Description of 
events leading up to 
shooting 
(i) Social network 
diagramming of 
actors and linkages 
 (ii) Chronology 
(timeline) of events 
(iii) Summary of 
observation 
statements 
(iv) Diagram of 
police office and 
witness locations 
2. AcciMap analysis 
Annotation of causal 
factors according to 
temporal aspects of 
the incident 
1. Systems description 
(i) Timeline 
(ii) Summary of 
contributory factors in 
HC (2007):  
2. Systems analysis 
Use of the Risk 
Management (ActorMap) 
framework focusing on: 
(i) Cross-level 
relationships related to 
previous findings in the 
literature 
(ii) Whole system 
relationships related to 
previous findings in the 
literature 
 
 
Table 2: Comparison of use of the RMF and AcciMap in the case 
studies 
 
The clearest differences in the use of the methods relates to the 
goals and intentions behind the analysis of the two accidents. In 
the case of the Stockwell shooting, one of the goals was to  
capture the dynamic nature of communication and decision-
making as it took place over a short period of time. Much of the 
data which formed the AcciMap was directly taken from the 
various reports written about Stockwell. This is especially the 
case at lower levels of the AcciMap (i.e., levels 1-3). By contrast, 
the Infection case study was motivated by the need to explore a 
set of more loosely defined factors that could be linked together 
to explain the recurrence of the outbreaks. Part of the intention 
was to go beyond some the dominant explanations of infection 
outbreaks (e.g., compliance to hygiene protocols) and seek 
explanations from the findings relating to similar organisational 
issues within accident research. Accordingly, the infection case 
study tended to identify explanations at higher levels of the RMF. 
Data covering the outbreaks was less detailed as compared to 
Stockwell and partly motivated the need to see explanations 
across levels of analysis. The timescale for the outbreaks was also 
much longer (2 years), as compared to the minute-by-minute 
unfolding of activities in the Stockwell shooting. 
 
Aspects of our goals and intentions of use with the methods, as 
well as the nature of data and the domain in question shaped the 
procedure used in the accident analysis. In many ways, our use of 
the methods appeared to be guided by implicit assumptions about 
their scope and suitability of their use for the two case studies. In 
the final section of the paper we focus on a set of criteria which 
could be used to judge the suitability, as well as scoping the 
procedural aspects, of the RMF and AcciMaps methods. 
 
5  Discussion 
 
In using the RMF and AcciMaps we were struck by the large 
range of alternatives and options for configuring and 
reconfiguring the original components set out by Rasmussen in 
his original description of the RMF and AcciMaps methods. This 
flexibility led us to attempt to articulate a set of criteria which 
could be help potential users to judge the suitability of one 
method, or type of procedure, against another. This type of „front 
end‟ guidance contrasts with the type of support provide by 
Branford et al. [2] which attempts to lay out a set of guidelines 
for building AcciMaps.  
 
An additional difference is that we focus not only the procedural 
aspects of systems analysis, but also on some of the conceptual 
choices and options which may be open to the analyst. Other 
methodologies for the analysis of complex work systems have 
benefited from the development of similar guidelines and 
considerations (e.g., Cognitive Work Analysis – Naikar et al., 
[14]). A final consideration is that the criteria are not intended to 
be prescriptive; rather, the intention is to support the flexible and 
sometimes exploratory nature of the two methods. 
 
5.1 Establishing the purpose of the analysis 
 
The most important step before beginning the analysis is to 
establish its purpose and overall goals. With the infection 
outbreak case study the intention was primarily to explore the 
interplay between the various causal factors leading up to the 
outbreaks. These factors unfolded over longer timescales as 
compared to Stockwell and what Turner called the „incubation 
period‟ [20] for the outbreaks was much longer. These types of 
considerations shaped the choice of the method in this case 
(RMF), as compared to Stockwell where the dynamics of the 
shooting required a more distributed, „time-stamped‟ 
representation within the AcciMap. 
5.2 Consideration of the role of causality, intentionality and 
the nature of system error in the analysis 
  
The distributed nature of error alongside the differences in time-
scale within the two case studies also shaped the outcomes from 
the analysis. The RMF was also chosen because it facilitated 
consideration of cross-level causal connections and linkages 
between macro and micro elements of the overall system. Error in 
this context was difficult to pin down to specific individuals, 
instead it manifested itself as a set of shared attitudes which 
infiltrated the culture of the hospital and blocked organisational 
learning. Organisational error in this form was easier to 
conceptually explore using the RMF. With Stockwell by contrast, 
the AcciMap format was more suited to building a „causal map‟ 
bringing together processes of decision-making and 
communication. 
 
5.3 Domain specific considerations 
 
The nature of the two domains and the structural properties of the 
systems and sub-systems within the case studies also played a 
role in shaping the choice of method. The infection outbreak 
involved a widely distributed and diverse set of organisations and 
actors. Coupling between the various actors within the overall 
system was often very loose. Within Stockwell the degree of 
coupling was similarly loose at upper levels of the AcciMap, but 
tighter within the lower levels. Consideration of issues of 
coupling between levels, as well as the communication 
requirements of actors in the system, also shaped the choice of 
the methods. 
 
5.4 Data and information inputs to the analysis 
  
Our use of the two methods showed some procedural similarities. 
Both cases started out by carrying out what might be called 
„domain analysis‟, that is, developing an understanding of the 
domain independent of the accident or disaster in question. This 
may involve reading accounts of similar accidents (e.g., other 
infection outbreaks, the report on the Kings Cross fire). 
Documentary inputs into the analysis can determine the nature of 
the method used. The RMF for example, was used for the 
Infection case study partly because information was unavailable 
regarding the specific actions of individuals (e.g., health care 
managers). Similar information on decision-making, 
communication was available for the Stockwell and was therefore 
more appropriate for analysis using AcciMaps. 
 
5.5 Constructing RMF and AcciMap representations 
  
The most extensive set of guidelines for using and constructing 
AcciMaps are available in Branford et al. [2]. These cover a set 
of prompts and questions to be used at levels within the 
AcciMap. These types of support for analysis can be very useful; 
however, there is also an additional need to build some form of 
wider options for choices which may be possible at each level. 
This is especially the case where the specific prompts or 
questions to ask at each level are dependent on characteristics of 
the domain or the nature of error in the system. Our experience of 
using the methods is that these guidelines could be extended to 
cover options for potential modifications to the methods (e.g., the 
use of multi-level theory, decision-ladders). 
 
5.6 Reviewing and validating the analysis 
 
The issue of the reliability and validity of the AcciMaps and 
RMF methods has been raised by a number of authors (e.g., [10, 
15]). Our experience is that in some cases, for example where the 
primary motivation for using the method is exploratory (e.g., in 
infection outbreaks case study), extensive validation may not be 
necessary. Branford [1] found that these are difficult with 
AcciMaps and that there is a need to acknowledge the subjective 
nature of analysis. Her findings suggested that there is a need to 
capture the underlying process and rationale during AcciMap 
judgments and decisions. 
 
  
6 Future work 
 
The criteria outlined in section 5 need further refinement and 
development. We hope to use some of the other examples of use 
of the RMF and AcciMaps (section 4) as a basis with which to 
develop more detailed and extensive guidance regarding the 
possibilities for using, tailoring and configuring components of 
the methods. Similarly, future work needs to be conducted on the 
provision of support in order to improve the reliability and 
validity of the two methods.   
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